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Abstract 
Previously, research on wishful thinking has found that desires bias older
children’s and adults’ predictions during probabilistic reasoning tasks. In
the present paper, we explore wishful thinking in children aged 3- to 10-
years-old.  Do young children  learn  to  be wishful  thinkers?  Or  do they
begin  with  a  wishful  thinking  bias  that  is  gradually  overturned  during
development? Across 5 experiments, we compare low- and middle-income
U.S. and Peruvian 3- to 10-year-old children (N=682). Children were asked
to  make  predictions  during  games  of  chance.  Across  experiments,
preschool  aged children  from all  backgrounds  consistently  displayed a
strong wishful thinking bias. However, the bias declined with age.
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Young children are wishful thinkers: The development of wishful
thinking in 3-to 10- year-old children
Introduction
Previously,  psychologists  have  found  that  both  adults  and  young
children frequently hold optimistic beliefs. However, the underlying cause of
this optimism is less clear. Some researchers have argued, more specifically,
for a ‘wishful thinking bias’, also called a ‘desirability bias’. According to this
hypothesis, a desire or preference for a specific outcome directly increases
the belief that the desirable outcome will occur. While several studies have
explicitly measured wishful thinking in adults and older children (see Krizan
&  Windschitl,  2007;  2009  for  review),  finding  some  support  for  this
hypothesis, previous studies have not explicitly measured wishful thinking in
young children. In the present paper, we explore wishful thinking in young
children, aged 3 to 10, from Peru and the U.S., to uncover the development
trajectory of wishful thinking. 
The Relationship Between Preferences and Expectations 
For decades researchers have documented a link between preferences
and  expectations,  finding  that  people  often  hold  expectations  that  are
congruent  with  their  preferences  (Granberg  & Brent,  1983;  Hayes,  1936;
Ogburn, 1934). For example, Granberg and Brent (1983) tallied survey data
across 8 presidential elections and found that 4 out of 5 U.S. adults believed
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their  preferred  presidential  candidate  would  win.  While  this  finding,  and
others,  suggests that people may have optimistic  beliefs,  it  is  not always
clear  why  people  have  these  beliefs.  Wishful  thinking,  as  opposed  to
optimism  more  generally,  specifically  implies  that  desires  have  a  causal
influence on beliefs.  In  the  example above,  presidential  preferences  may
have  driven  people’s  election  predictions  –  they  may  have  believed  the
candidate would win precisely because they wanted the candidate to win, a
classic case of wishful thinking. Alternatively, however, the prediction may
have  driven  the  preference;  people  may  have  preferred  that  specific
candidate because they believed that candidate would win (not a case of
wishful  thinking).  Finally,  a  third  variable  could  have  driven  both  their
preferences,  and  their  predictions;  for  example,  both  predictions  and
preferences could be shaped by other people’s predictions and preferences,
also called a ‘bandwagon’ effect’ (and not a case of wishful thinking). 
The unrealistic  belief  would  only  count  as wishful  thinking if  it  was
directly caused by the desire, so to demonstrate wishful thinking we need to
manipulate  desires  without  otherwise  changing  beliefs.  To  explicitly  test
wishful thinking,  researchers have used games of chance to experimentally
manipulate participants’ desires, and then measured the influence of those
desires on participants’ predictions about stochastic events. 
The first ‘wishful thinking’ study was conducted with 9- to 11-year-old
children. In this study, Marks (1951) introduced children to a deck of cards,
some of which were marked on one side, and told children the percentage of
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marked  cards  in  the  deck.  Across  conditions,  decks  contained  different
percentages of marked cards (10, 30, 50, 70, and 90%). Across conditions,
participants  were  also  told  they  would  win  (gain  condition)  or  lose  (loss
condition) a point if they blindly drew a marked card from the deck. After
this, participants were asked to guess which card they thought they would
select from the deck. Responses varied according to both the probability and
desirability  of  selecting  a  marked  card.  Holding  likelihood  constant,
participants believed they were more likely to select a marked card in the
gain  conditions  than  in  the  loss  conditions,  suggesting  that  desirability
altered expectations.  Children’s  estimates of  drawing their  preferred card
was heavily  skewed across these different  ratios.  For  example,  when the
probability of drawing a desirable marked card was 5 to 5, 90% of children
believed they would draw the desirable card. When the probability of  the
desirable  outcome was a slim 1 to 9,  47% of  children still  believed they
would draw the desirable card.
Since  this  time,  several  variations  of  this  paradigm  have  been
conducted  with  adults,  but  none  with  younger  children.  In  one  of  these
studies, Irwin (1953) used a nearly identical paradigm to Marks (1951). Irwin
found that when the marked card was desirable, 61% of participants (across
the various probabilities) stated they would draw a marked card, however
when the marked card was undesirable, only 48% did so, suggesting some
effect of  desirability  on adults’  expectations,  albeit  a much smaller  effect
than Marks found in children.  Meta-analyses drawing upon several  similar
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studies  yielded  comparable  findings  (Krizan  &  Windschitl,  2007;  2009).
Contrasting these findings with Marks (1951) implies that a wishful thinking
bias may be stronger for school aged children than it is for adults. 
This  raises  questions  about  the  development  of  wishful  thinking.
Perhaps a wishful thinking bias is acquired during early childhood. If this is
so,  we  might  predict  that  the  bias  would  increase  with  development.
Alternatively,  desires  could  initially  constrain  young children’s  predictions
and children may gradually overcome this bias with age. If so, we should see
a desire bias even in very young children, and it should weaken over the
course of development. 
Developmental Research on Optimism and Positivity
While  wishful  thinking  has  not  been  explicitly  measured  in  young
children,  several  developmental  studies  have  explored  optimism  more
generally.  Many of  these studies  have measured young children’s  beliefs
about trait stability, finding that younger children often exhibit a ‘positivity
bias’  when they evaluate  trait  stability  over  the  course  of  time --  young
children  expect  negative  traits  to  change  for  the  better  but  believe  that
positive traits will remain stable (Diesendruck & Lindenbaum, 2009; Heyman
& Giles, 2004; Lockhart, Chang, & Story, 2002; Lockhart, Nakashima, Inagaki,
& Keil, 2008). For example, Lockhart et al. (2002) introduced young children
(5-to 6-year-olds), older children (7-to 10-year-olds) and adults to a story in
which characters wanted to change a negative attribute for the better (e.g.
6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
RUNNING HEAD: Young children are wishful thinkers
become more athletic, or more attractive). Younger children were likely to
believe that  these negative attributes  would  change for  the better,  while
adults  judged them to be more stable  over time.  Similarly,  other studies
have  asked  children  about  story  characters  who  wanted  to  change  their
positive attribute into a negative one. For example, Heyman and Giles (2004)
introduced children to a character who was smart but did not want to be
smart.  In these types of  scenarios,  young children tend to state that the
positive  trait  will  persist  over  time,  even  when  the  protagonist  wished
otherwise. 
Similarly, in one study, Boseovski and Lee (2008) introduced children
to  a  story  character  who  either  performed  positive  or  negative  actions
towards another character. In this study, children readily extended positive
attributes to the story character after viewing positive actions; however they
were hesitant to make a negative inference after viewing negative actions.
Relatedly,  Boseovski  (2012)  explored  children’s  endorsement  of  an
informant’s testimony, finding that children were more likely to endorse an
informant who stated a person was nice, rather than one who stated they
were mean. 
While these results suggest that young children often hold positive or
optimistic beliefs, it is not clear if young children’s  own preferences caused
their responses. For example, while some of these studies explicitly stated a
story  character’s  desires  (e.g.  stated  that  the  story  character  wanted  to
change), and experimentally manipulated positive and negative trait valence
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(e.g.  being nice  vs.  mean),  none have measured if  the participants’  own
desires actually aligned with the story character’s desires or the trait valence
(Heyman & Giles, 2004; Lockhart, et al. 2002; Lockhart, et al. 2008). As there
were no explicit  manipulations  of  participants  desires or  measurement of
their  preferences,  it  would  be  a  stretch  to  argue that  these findings  are
evidence for wishful thinking in young children, although they are in line with
this hypothesis. Furthermore,  there are several alternative explanations for
children’s optimism in these previous studies. These alternative explanations
are discussed in the section below. 
In contrast to the studies reviewed above, other developmental studies
have  taken  a  first-person  perspective,  finding  that  young  children  often
exhibit over-confidence in their own abilities across a variety of situations.
For example, Parsons and Ruble (1977) found that preschool-aged children
expected to do well on a puzzle task, even after being told they were doing
poorly;  however,  6-year-olds  updated  their  expectations  in  response  to
negative feedback. Similarly, Plumert (1995) found that 6-year-olds, but not
8-year-olds, demonstrated over-confidence in their physical abilities, such as
running fast. In another study, Lockhart, Goddu, and Keil (2017) found that
5- to 7-year-olds were more likely to think that they would eventually acquire
complete knowledge than were 8- to 10-year-olds.  
In  these  first-person  studies,  it  seems  quite  plausible  that  children
preferred  the  positive  outcome  (e.g.  running  fast  or  acquiring  more
knowledge).  If  so,  this  preference  could  have  influenced their  responses.
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However,  again  children’s  desires  were  not  experimentally  manipulated
across  conditions,  nor  were  they  explicitly  measured.  In  addition,  as
Lockhart, et al., (2002) discuss, there are several alternative explanations for
these  results.  These  alternative  explanations  are  outlined  in  the  section
below. 
Alternative Explanations for Young Children’s Optimism
Beliefs about the base rate prevalence of positive attributes.
Experimental  evidence  suggests  developmental  differences  in  children’s
prior  knowledge  about  personality  traits;  younger  children  believe  that
positive traits are more prevalent than older children (Lockhart, et al., 2002).
A  strong  prior  belief  in  favor  of  positive  attributes  may cause inferential
biases,  even  after  viewing  evidence  to  the  contrary  (Gopnik,  Griffiths,  &
Lucas, 2015; Seiver, Gopnik, & Goodman, 2013). In this case, it would be
important to explore why children have different beliefs about the base rate
prevalence of traits. Children may believe that positive traits are common
because this belief aligns with their desires (e.g. wishful thinking). However,
a number of  other factors could shape the development of  these beliefs,
such as evidence from the testimony of adults.
 Beliefs about the controllability of traits. Research also suggests
that  younger  children  believe  people  have  more  control  over  the
development of  traits and abilities than do adults (Lockhart,  et al.,  2002;
Stipek & Mac Iver, 1989). This may cause younger children to believe that
9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
RUNNING HEAD: Young children are wishful thinkers
people can improve over time if they want to. Again, wishful thinking could
influence children’s beliefs about the controllability of traits; young children
may believe that people can control outcomes because they wish it to be so.
However, young children may believe this for other reasons. In particular,
they may encounter first-person or testimony evidence that leads them to
conclude this. 
First-person evidence. Children likely receive different patterns of
evidence in their day to day lives than older children and adults, and this
could shape their beliefs about controllability and malleability. Indeed, young
children’s traits and abilities do rapidly change during development, which
may lead children to believe that traits  and abilities  are quite  malleable.
Young children may also believe that adults generally have more positive
traits  than  children;  for  example,  adults  do  run  much  faster  and  have
acquired a much larger body of knowledge. As a result, children may come
to believe that with age everyone’s relative standing will improve. 
Testimony evidence. Adults  may also  selectively  provide  younger
children with positive and encouraging feedback and this may cause young
children  to  develop  optimistic  beliefs  about  their  own  abilities.  While
kindergarteners generally rate their future academic attainment higher than
4th graders do,  Stipek and Daniels  (1988) found that kindergarteners who
were given salient positive and negative feedback, similar to the feedback 4th
graders generally receive, rated themselves comparably to 4th graders. In
another  study,  Stipek,  Roberts  and Sanborn  (1984)  found that  4-year-old
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children adjusted their estimates of success in response to adult feedback.
Both of these studies suggest that testimony evidence does shape children’s
beliefs about their own abilities. This sort of testimony evidence, rather than
wishful  thinking,  could  have  underpinned  children’s  confidence  in  the
previous studies. 
At least one study provides more direct support for wishful thinking. In
this study, Stipek, et al. (1984) explored whether 4-year-olds’ overconfidence
was  impacted  by  incentivizing  success.  Children  were  introduced  to  a
challenging task. In an incentivized condition, children were told they would
receive  a  reward  for  success;  children  in  a  control  condition  were  not
rewarded for success. After struggling with the task, children’s estimates of
eventual success remained higher when success was incentivized than when
it  was  not,  suggesting  that  manipulating  children’s  desires  (through
manipulating  the  incentive)  altered  children’s  expectancies  about  the
outcome. However, again, there is at least one good alternative explanation
for  this  finding;  it  is  possible  that  through  offering  an  incentive,
experimenters also altered children’s motivation, which in turn could have
rationally  influenced their  actual  likelihood  of  success  and  corresponding
predictions.  In  this  case,  desires  would  not  directly  impact  children’s
expectations, but rather their motivation, which in turn could influence their
expectations – in other words children might recognize that they were more
motivated  in  the  incentivized  condition  and  accurately  predict  that
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motivation improves performance. If so, wishful thinking would not be the
cause of children’s optimism. 
There  is  also  research  indicating  that  desires  strongly  constrain
children’s  initial  beliefs about agency. For example,  Gopnik and Slaughter
(1991) found that preschool  aged children’s recollection of their own past
desires  was  often  biased  by  a  current  desire.  In  another  study,  Moore,
Jarrold, Russell, Lumb, Sapp and MacCallum, (1995) asked children to infer
another person’s desire when it was in conflict with their own desire, and
experimentally  varied  the  magnitude  of  participants’  desires.  They  found
that only 5-year-olds could accurately predict another person’s desire when
there was a strong conflict of desire; 3- and 4-year-olds could not. However,
when there was not a strong conflict of desire, even 3-year-olds could make
accurate judgments.  These studies differ from studies on wishful  thinking
because they ask children to predict desires, rather than future outcomes
that are relevant to participants. However, results could indicate that desires
more broadly constrain young children’s inferences. 
Taken  together,  research  supports  the  notion  that  young  children
frequently  hold  optimistic  beliefs,  particularly  about  traits  and  abilities.
Research  also  suggests  that  desires  bias  young  children’s  ability  to
accurately predict other desires. However, it is not yet clear if young children
engage in wishful thinking, and if desires bias children’s predictions about
outcomes. 
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Previous studies have, however, explicitly measured wishful thinking in
school  aged  children  and  adults,  generally  finding  a  bias  when  asking
participants  to  make  binary  predictions  about  stochastic  events.  These
findings suggest that the bias may attenuate with age. No previous studies
have directly  tested wishful  thinking in  young children,  and in  particular,
none have measured if desires influence young children’s predictions about
stochastic events. In the present paper, experimenters use games of chance
to directly manipulate young children’s desires and measure the influence of
desirability on probability judgments. 
Probability Judgments in Early Childhood
One reason that a Marks (1951) wishful thinking style of paradigm has
not  been  extended  to  young  children  sooner  is  because  of  the  earlier
consensus that young children have difficulty understanding probability. In
the first of these studies, Piaget and Inhelder (1975) introduced 5- to 12-
year-old children to a container holding two colors of chips. The proportion of
each color  varied.  Children were asked to point to the color  of  chip they
believed would be randomly selected. Children under the age of seven did
not provide accurate predictions. 
Other studies have challenged this position, showing that under certain
conditions  young  children  do  demonstrate  a  basic  understanding  of
probability  (Denison  &  Xu,  2014;  Yost,  Siegel,  &  Andrews,  1962).  For
example, Yost, et al. (1962) informed five-year-old children that they would
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receive  a  prize  if  they randomly  selected a  specific color  of  chip  from a
container.  Then  children  were  shown  two  containers,  one  with  a  higher
proportion of desirable chips than the other. Children were asked to point to
the container they wanted to take a chip from. Children tended to point to
the container with the higher proportion of  desirable chips.  In this  study,
experimenters also administered a variation of Piaget and Inhelder’s (1975)
task  and  found  again  that  children  did  not  make  accurate  probability
judgments. However, they also found that if children completed the above
described  task  prior  to  the  Piagetian  task,  they  reliably  made  accurate
predictions on the Piagetian task. 
Given  the  mixed  results  in  these  previous  studies,  the  present
experiments include baseline control conditions that explore three-to seven-
7-olds’  ability  to make accurate and explicit  verbal  probability  judgments
after viewing a distribution. These control conditions are similar to the classic
Piagetian task but were designed to be simpler and more straightforward for
children. 
Introduction to Experiments 1 to 5
This paper reports findings from five experiments exploring the effects
of desirability and probability on 3- to 10-year-old children’s predictions. We
included  children  from Peru  as  well  as  the  U.S.  We  also  included  lower
income  as  well  as  middle  income  U.S.  preschool  children.  Recently,
psychologists  have  become conscious  of  the  limitations  of  only  sampling
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from  W.E.I.R.D.  (western,  educated,  industrialized,  rich  and  democratic)
demographics. For example, a survey of published literature found that less
than 7% of published developmental psychology studies sampled children
from Africa,  Central  and South America,  Asia,  Israel  and the Middle East,
while less than 1% sampled children from South or Central America (Nielsen,
Haun,  Kärtner,  &  Legare,  2017).  This  general  lack  of  diversity  makes  it
difficult  to  build  a  comprehensive  picture  of  how  development  unfolds
universally. Moreover, it seems plausible that cultural and SES differences
might  affect  the  development  of  wishful  thinking  and  optimism  more
generally, though specific comparisons and predictions are not clear given
the  paucity  of  evidence.  This  gap  can  only  be  addressed  by  actually
conducting studies in a wider range of cultures and socio-economic settings
and  using  these  findings  to  generate  theoretical  predictions;  this  is  our
strategy in the present research. 
In Experiment 1, children viewed a card deck composed of two types of
cards. In Experiments 2, 3, 4, and 5 children viewed a bag of plastic eggs
composed of two colors. Children were asked to guess what card type or egg
color had been randomly selected. The distribution was heavily skewed so
that  80% of  objects  were  of  one type,  and only  20% were  of  the  other.
Baseline  control  conditions  measured  children’s  probability  judgments.  In
experimental  conditions,  the  improbable  outcome  was  also  desirable.  If
young  children  can  make  accurate  probability  judgments,  they  should
reliably  predict  the  more  likely  outcome  in  the  control  conditions.  If
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desirability  alters  expectancies,  children  should  predict  the  unlikely  (but
desirable) outcome more often in the experimental conditions than in the
control conditions. 
Experiment 1 Methods
Participants
In the U.S., participants were recruited and tested at children’s science
museums in  the San Francisco Bay Area.  The sample was predominantly
middle-  and  upper-middle  class,  primarily  composed  of  Asian  (35%),
Caucasian (33%), and Hispanic or Latino (17%) children.  In Peru, children
were recruited and tested in  Innova schools  located in and around Lima,
Peru.  This  is  a  chain  of  private  schools  designed  to  serve  largely  lower-
middle  class  children  in  Peru.  Children  were  primarily  second  or  third
generation internal immigrants from the Peruvian highlands. Children were
from an emerging middle-class background- families who have traditionally
been in the lower class but recently have accumulated some expendable
income.  All  schools  were  located  in  low-income,  and  largely  high-crime
neighborhoods. 
Two-hundred-and  sixty  children  participated  in  Experiment  1.  The
experimental condition included 41 U.S. 4-year-olds, 41 U.S. 6-year-olds, 23
Peruvian  4-year-olds  and  25  Peruvian  6-year-olds.  The  control  condition
included 41 U.S. 4-year-olds, 41 U.S. 6-year-olds, 23 Peruvian 4-year-olds,
and 25 Peruvian 6-year-olds. See Table 1 for mean ages and age ranges. In
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addition, one child was dropped because of parental interference and two
because of experimenter error.   
Stimuli and Protocol
Experimenters  used white  index cards  with  shapes pictured on one
side.  The cards featured black squares and circles (U.S.)  or triangles and
circles (Peru). This study was developed in the U.S. then extended to children
in Peru. During the initial piloting in Peru, several of the younger children
called the square a triangle, so experimenters replaced the square shape
with a triangle shape. The experimenters  also used small  bins  filled with
colored plastic containers. The containers held prizes. U.S. participants were
tested in English, and Peruvian participants in Spanish. Study protocols were
translated and back-translated by bilingual research personnel.  
Procedure
In the U.S., children were tested in a quiet corner of the museum. In
Peru, children were tested in private office spaces in their schools. First, the
experimenter  asked  children  if  they  liked  prizes.  Upon  affirmation,  the
experimenter told children they could win prizes. Children were instructed to
select one container from a bin and were told that it  had a prize inside.
Before the child could open the container, the experimenter placed it to the
side of the table, explaining that the child might be able to win the prize
later.
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The experimenter next introduced participants to a deck of 20 cards
and told them that the cards had circles and squares (U.S.A.) or circles and
triangles (Peru) on them. The experimenter explained that they were going
to mix the cards up, then randomly select one card from the deck.
Next,  the  experimenter  explained  the  prize  contingencies,  which
differed across conditions.  In  the  control condition,  participants  were told
that they would  win an additional  prize,  regardless of  the experimenter’s
card  selection  from the  deck.  In  the  experimental condition,  participants
were told that they would only win an additional prize if one of the types of
cards (i.e., the unlikely card) was selected, and would lose their initial prize if
the  other  type  was  selected.  Thus,  in  the  control  condition,  the  children
believed  they  would  receive  two  prizes  regardless  of  the  experimenter’s
selection,  while  in  the  experimental  condition  they  believed  they  would
receive two prizes if  the experimenter selected the unlikely  card,  and no
prizes if the experimenter selected the likely card. 
In the experimental condition, children were asked to state which of
the card types they wanted. If they said they wanted the card that resulted
in no prizes, the experimenter explained the prize contingencies again, and
asked  the  question  again.  All  but  one  child  agreed  they  wanted  the
experimenter to select the desirable card.
Next, the experimenter sorted all cards face up by shape type. Then,
the  experimenter  and  participants  counted  the  number  of  cards  of  each
shape. Card decks contained 16 cards of the majority shape, and 4 cards of
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the minority  shape.  In  the experimental  condition,  the majority  card  was
associated with loss, while the minority card was associated with gain. 
Following this,  the experimenter turned the cards over, mixed them up,
selected one card randomly from the deck, and placed it face down on the
table.  Children  were  asked  to  guess  which  card  the  experimenter  had
selected (e.g.,  “What  card  do  you think  this  is?”).  A  memory  check  was
introduced part way through data collection. After making a prediction, 219
children were also asked to state the majority card (e.g., “Do you remember
which card there was more of?”). Majority card type was counterbalanced. 
Experiment 1 Results
Children were scored on whether they stated that the majority card
type  had  been  selected.  A  binary  logistic  regression  explored  if  children
predicted the majority  card type using condition,  country,  and age group
(categorical:  4  vs.  6)  as  predictor  variables.  The  resulting  model  was
statistically significant,  χ2(3)  = 33.129,  p < .0001,  Nagelkerke R2 = .163;
there was a main effect of condition, χ2 = 23.127, df = 1, p <.0001, and age,
χ2 = 8.266, df = 1, p = .004, but not of country, p=.355, ns. Overall, children
were more likely to choose the majority card type in the control condition
than they were in the experimental condition, and older children chose the
majority card type more often than younger children (see Figure 1). 
Next, we were curious if  developmental differences were specific to
either the control  or experimental  condition.  To explore this,  we split  the
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participants by condition, and used two binary logistic regressions to explore
if  age  impacted  predictions.  For  the  control  condition,  the  model  was
significant, χ2(1) = 7.875,  p =.005, Nagelkerke R2 = .088; and age was a
significant predictor variable, χ2  =7.266, df= 1,  p=.007. Age, however, did
not impact performance in the experimental condition, the model was not
significant, χ2(1) = 2.013, p=.156, Nagelkerke R2 = .021; and age was not a
significant predictor variable, χ2 = 1.997, df = 1, p <.158. In sum, with age,
children provided more accurate responses in the control condition, however,
4- and 6-year-olds were equally likely to engage in wishful thinking in the
experimental condition.
In the control condition, children reliably predicted the majority card
type; 99 of 130 children (or 76%; SD= .43; 95% CI= .69-.84) predicted the
majority card type, which is significantly greater than chance, p<.0001, two-
tailed binomial test. This was also true when both the 4- and 6-year-old age
groups were considered separately (4-year-olds: 42 of 64, or 66%; SD=.48,
95% CI= .54- .78; p=.017, two-tailed; 6-year-olds: 57 of 66, or 86%; SD=.35,
95% CI= .78- .95; p<.0001, two-tailed). In the experimental condition, 61 of
130 children (or 47%; SD= .5; 95% CI= .38- .56) chose the majority card,
which is not significantly different from chance, p=.539, ns. A power analysis
was  conducted  using  the  program  G*power,  and  the  means  presented
above. Results suggest a total sample size of 90 to find the main effect of
condition (with power 1- β set to .80; α = .05; two-tailed test), indicating that
the sample size in the current study was more than adequate. 
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< Insert Figure 1 >
Two-hundred-and nineteen children were asked if  they remembered
which card there was more of, as well as which card there was less of. In the
control condition, 83% of children answered both questions correctly. In the
experimental condition, 89% of children correctly answered both questions
(chance is 25%). Looking only at children who responded correctly to the
memory  checks,  in  the  control  condition  62  of  90  children  guessed  the
majority, and in the experimental condition 43 of 98 did so. A Fisher’s exact
test confirms that the difference between conditions remained significant,
p=.0007.  Children’s  optimism  in  the  experimental  condition  cannot  be
explained by a failure to remember the distribution. 
Audible video recordings were obtained for 72 children in the control
condition,  and  85  in  the  experimental  condition.  Using  these  recordings,
children were retroactively scored on whether they correctly stated the prize
contingencies  associated  with  each  of  the  cards  without  prompting,  and
without any reexplanation from the experimenter. Eighty-three percent (or
60 of 72) of the children in the control condition correctly stated that both
cards  would  result  in  two  prizes,  while  65%  (or  55  of  85)  of  children
accurately  recalled the prize contingencies  in  the experimental  condition.
Looking only at these children, 75% (or 45 of 60) stated the majority card in
the control  condition,  while 55% (or 30 of 55) did so in the experimental
condition.  A  Fisher’s  exact  test  reveals  that  the  difference  between
conditions remained significant, p=.031 (two-tailed). 
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Experiment 1 Discussion
Study 1 suggests that 4- and 6-year-old children’s verbal predictions
were  influenced  by  both  desirability  and  probability.  Children  scored
significantly  above  chance  in  the  control  condition,  and  there  was  a
significant  difference  between  control  and  experimental  conditions,
indicating an effect of wishful thinking on children’s judgments. 
Older children overall were more likely to state the majority card than
younger children in the control condition, however there was no effect of age
in  the  experimental  condition.  This  indicates  that  both  4-and  6-year-olds
were equally likely to engage in wishful thinking, even though 6-year-olds
displayed more advanced probabilistic  reasoning skills.  Four-year-olds  did
score above chance in the control condition, however, their performance was
still not impressive.
One  concern  is  that  children  scored  at  chance in  the  experimental
condition. It is possible that desirability biased children’s answers, resulting
in a pattern of responses that was meaningfully different from the control
condition,  but  coincidently  at  chance.  Alternatively,  it  is  possible  that
tracking the two levels of prize contingencies (0 vs. 2 prizes), as well as both
gain and loss contingencies was difficult for children, and children resorted to
guessing.
This  raises  questions  about  whether  the  experimental  design  was
suitable for young children. For example, gathering and shuffling the cards
took a while, and there was a substantial gap in time between when children
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viewed  the  distribution,  and  when  the  card  was  selected.  The  memory
checks at the beginning of the experiment were lengthy, and many children
seemed  to  lose  interest  during  these.  Given  this,  it  is  possible  that  the
developmental  trends  were  caused,  at  least  in  part,  by  developmental
differences in working memory, or attentional regulation. There was also no
reward for correct answers in the control; this may have influenced younger
children’s responses.
In Experiment 2, we attempted to control  for these possibilities and
explore whether we could replicate the previous experiment using different
materials  and  procedure.  First,  we  used  a  shorter,  more  visually  simple
version  of  this  task.  The  experimenter  chose  a  random  sample  from  a
collection of objects which visibly included more of one type than another
(an  “urn”  type  of  probability  task).  Both  infants,  implicitly,  and  older
preschool  children,  explicitly,  have  demonstrated  that  they  understand
probability in “urn” tasks and assume random sampling (Xu & Garcia, 2008:
Denison & Xu, 2014; Denison,  Bonawitz, Gopnik & Griffiths,  2013). We also
included an additional control condition, where children were incentivized for
providing a correct answer, to explore the possibility that greater motivation
might improve the younger children’s performance on the control task. In
addition,  this  new control  condition  required children to track 3 colors  of
eggs that contained 2 different  amounts of  prizes (0 or  2),  matching the
cognitive demands of the experimental condition. 
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Experiment 2 Methods
Participants
One-hundred-and twenty-one North American and 128 Peruvian 3- to
6-year-olds  participated.  Children  were  divided  across  3  conditions:  the
experimental  condition,  the  motivated  control  condition,  and  the
unmotivated control condition. See Table 1 for further information on subject
numbers and age. Additionally, 3 participants were tested and not included:
1 child voluntarily withdrew, 1 child failed to provide a response, and 1 was
dropped due to experimenter error. 
Stimuli
In Peru, the experimenter used a special blue plastic egg (motivated
control condition only), a white cloth, a brown paper bag, and a clear plastic
bag  containing  10  yellow  and  purple  plastic  eggs.  Some eggs  contained
stickers.  In  the  U.S.,  stimuli  were  similar,  but  egg  colors  differed.  The
experimenter used a silver plastic  egg (motivated control  condition only),
and a clear plastic bag containing 10 yellow and blue eggs. Experiment 2
was initially developed and tested in Lima, Peru, where experimenters had
limited access to study stimuli.  U.S. experimenters changed the egg color
from purple to blue because it was thought that some children (mostly girls)
might have a strong preference for purple eggs, and this might impact the
results. The special blue egg (motivated control condition) was painted silver
in the U.S. to differentiate it from the other eggs. 
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Procedure
Experimental  Condition: Children were first  introduced to a clear
bag containing purple  and yellow (Peru)  or  blue and yellow (U.S.)  plastic
eggs.  The  color  distribution  was  8  to  2,  and  the  majority  color  was
counterbalanced. To ensure that children took note of the different colors
and could differentiate them, children were asked to point to one of each
color of egg. Then, the experimenter told participants that the minority egg
color contained 2 stickers and the majority color did not have any stickers.
Following this, the experimenter took 1 of each type of egg out of the bag,
opened them up, and showed the children what was inside. The example
eggs were then reassembled and placed back inside of the plastic bag. Next,
the experimenter asked participants to point to an egg containing 2 stickers
and an egg containing no stickers. The experimenter and child counted out
loud the number of each type. Then the experimenter again asked the child
if they remembered which egg had 2 stickers, and which egg had no stickers.
Next the experimenter held the clear plastic bag of eggs over a brown paper
bag and explained that they were going to place the clear bag into the paper
bag and select 1 egg without looking into the bag, and the child would have
to guess the color. The experimenter also told participants that if the egg
had prizes inside, the child could keep them. 
Then, the experimenter lowered the clear bag into the opaque bag,
reached in  and  placed a  white  cloth  over  a  randomly  selected  egg.  The
selected egg was immediately placed on the table, still under the cloth and
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covered  by  the  experimenter’s  hands.  The  experimenter  said,  “Hmm,  I
wonder what color it is. What color do you think it is? Purple or yellow?” The
order in which the 2 colors were listed was counterbalanced. 
Unmotivated Control Condition: This condition was identical to the
experimental condition, except that all the eggs contained 2 stickers. 
Motivated  control  condition: First,  the  experimenter  showed
participants a special blue egg (Peru) or silver egg (U.S.), explaining that it
contained 2 stickers, which could be won. They then opened the special egg
to show that it actually contained 2 stickers. 
The rest of the procedure was similar to the other conditions, except
for 2 differences. First, there were no stickers inside any of the other eggs
(i.e., the eggs in the clear plastic bag that formed the distribution from which
the experimenter was sampling). Second, children were told that they would
win the stickers inside the special egg if they correctly guessed what color
the  experimenter  selected  from  the  bag.  This  is  different  from  the
experimental and unmotivated control conditions, in which children were told
that they would win whatever was inside of the egg selected from the bag.
This condition was included to test whether children who were motivated to
be accurate in their predictions would perform better than children who were
not.  It  also  better  matched  the  cognitive  demands  of  the  experimental
condition, in that children had to track 2 amounts of prizes (0 vs. 2 stickers)
across  3  colors  of  eggs,  rather  than  just  1  type  of  prize  contingency  (2
stickers) across 2 colors of eggs. 
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In all 3 conditions, after children guessed what color of egg was under
the cloth, they were asked to recall the egg color there was “more of.” In the
experimental condition, they were also asked to recall which egg color they
wanted. We included this question after the child’s guess in Experiment 2—
as opposed to  before the child’s guess in Experiment 1—to control for the
possibility  that  stating  a  preference  might  have  primed  participants’
guesses. At the end of the procedure, the experimenter revealed the egg
color. All children were immediately given prizes, regardless of the outcome-
either the prizes inside of the egg, or a reward for playing the game. 
Experiment 2 Results
Children were scored on whether they guessed that the majority egg
color had been drawn from the bag. First a binary logistic regression was
used  to  compare  the  experimental  to  the  unmotivated  control  condition,
using country, exact age (as a continuous variable, given that the children’s
ages ranged from 3 to 6), and condition as predictor variables. The resulting
model was statistically significant, χ2(3) = 46.133, p < .0001, Nagelkerke R2
= .329. Analyses revealed a main effect of condition, χ2 = 32.971, df = 1, p
<.0001, and age, χ2 = 7.43, df = 1, p = .006, but not country, p=.419, ns. As
in  Experiment  1,  children  chose  the  majority  egg  more  often  in  the
unmotivated control condition than in the experimental condition, and older
children chose the majority egg color more often than younger children. 
A second binary logistic  regression compared the motivated control
condition to the experimental condition. Country, exact age (as a continuous
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variable), and condition were entered into the model as predictor variables.
The  resulting  model  was  also  statistically  significant,  χ2(3)  =  39.927,  p
< .0001, Nagelkerke R2 = .283. Analyses again revealed a main effect of
condition,  χ2 =  32.71,  df =  1,  p <.0001.  Age  trended  towards  being  a
significant  predictor,  χ2 =  3.151,  df =  1,  p =  .076.  Country  was  not
significant,  p=.444,  ns. Children chose the majority egg more often in the
motivated control  condition than in the experimental  condition,  and older
children trended towards choosing the majority egg color more often than
younger  children.  As  in  Experiment  1,  children  demonstrated  a  wishful
thinking bias.
Next,  we  split  data  by  condition,  and  used  three  binary  logistic
regressions  to  explore  if  age  influenced  responses  within  each  condition
individually.  In  the  experimental  condition,  age  did  not  predict  children’s
performance.  The  model  was  not  significant,  χ2(1)=  2.527,  p =.112,
Nagelkerke R2 = .046, and age was not a significant predictor, χ2 = 2.456, df
=  1,  p =.117.  Age,  however,  did  impact  children’s  performance  in  the
unmotivated control  condition.  The model was significant, χ2(1)= 5.132,  p
=.023, Nagelkerke R2 = .087, and age was a significant predictor variable, χ2
= 4.664, df = 1, p =.031. In the motivated control condition, the model was
again not significant, χ2 (1)= .806, p =.369, Nagelkerke R2 = .013, and age
was not a significant predictor variable, χ2 = .79,  df = 1,  p =.374. In sum,
with  age,  children  provided  more  accurate  responses  in  the unmotivated
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control  condition,  however  age  did  not  impact  responses  in  either  the
experimental or motivated control conditions. 
Two-tailed binomial  tests confirmed that children chose the majority
option significantly above chance in the unmotivated control condition (57 of
81, or 70%; SD=.46; 95% CI = .6- .81), p=.0003, as well as in the motivated
control condition (59 of 86, or 67%;  SD=.47; 95% CI= .59-.79),  p=.0007;
there were no differences between the two control conditions,  p=.867,  ns,
two-tailed Fisher’s exact test. In contrast, children scored significantly below
chance in the experimental condition. Only 19 of 82, or 23% (SD= .42; 95%
CI=.14-.33) of children stated the experimenter had selected the majority
egg,  p<.0001. Most children believed that the experimenter had selected
the desirable, yet highly improbable, egg. A power analysis was conducted
using  the  software  G*power,  and  the  means  presented  above.  Results
suggest  a  total  sample  size  of  37  to  find  the  difference  between  the
experimental and unmotivated control conditions, and a total sample size of
39 to find the difference between the experimental and motivated control
conditions (with power 1- β set to .80; α = .05; two-tailed test). Again, this
suggests  that  the  sample  size  used in  the  current  study was  more  than
adequate and validates the sample sizes used in the following experiments,
which enlist a similar paradigm.
In the experimental condition 83% of participants stated they wanted
the egg with the prizes, and 76% correctly stated which egg there was more
of. In the motivated control condition, 85% correctly stated the majority egg
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color, and 91% did so in the unmotivated control condition. Looking only at
children  who  passed  the  memory  check  questions,  and  also  stated  they
wanted the egg with the prizes, in the unmotivated control 50 of 74 (68%)
children predicted the majority egg, in the motivated control condition 48 of
72 (67%) guessed the majority egg, and in the experimental condition 11 of
52 (21%) predicted the majority egg. Fisher’s exact tests confirm that the
difference  between  the  unmotivated  control  and  experimental  conditions
remained significant, p<.0001, as did the difference between the motivated
control and experimental conditions, p<.0001. 
 
Experiment 2 Discussion 
Like Experiment 1, Experiment 2 indicated a difference between the
experimental and control conditions, supporting the hypothesis that young
children engage in wishful thinking. In the experimental condition, very few
children,  only  23%,  predicted  the  likely  outcome,  which  was  significantly
below chance. Age did not impact children’s responses in the experimental
condition. 
In  control  conditions,  children  again  made  accurate  probability
judgments,  scoring  above  chance  on  both  control  conditions.  Children’s
performance in the unmotivated control condition was generally similar to
their performance in Experiment 1, where children’s accuracy increased with
age. Performance in the motivated control condition, however, did not show
an age effect. This suggests that the age differences in control conditions
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might  reflect  motivational  differences.  Children’s  mean  scores,  however,
were similar across all control conditions. 
In  the experimental  condition in Experiment 2,  most children (77%)
stated the unlikely (and desirable) outcome, whereas in Experiment 1, only
53% did so. This may be because the design in Experiment 2 was simpler
and  more  straightforward  for  children,  decreasing  the  noise  in  children’s
responses.  A few changes in particular  may have made the experimental
condition easier for young children to follow. First, prizes were inside of the
eggs,  rather than contingently  given to children from an external  source.
Second,  in  Experiment  2,  the  eggs  simply  had  2  prizes  or  no  prizes.  In
Experiment  1  children  were  given  an  initial  prize,  then,  based  on  the
experimenter’s selection they were either given 1 more prize, or the initial
prize  was  taken  away.  This  may  have  been  confusing.  Additionally,
Experiment 2 was faster,  and more visually appealing,  possibly  making it
easier for children to track the information. 
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we extend this paradigm to 3- to 5-year-old children
enrolled in Head Start  programs in Berkeley,  California.  To be eligible  for
enrollment  in  Head  Start,  families’  income  must  fall  below  the  federal
poverty level, which, at the time of testing, was below $24,600 for a family of
4 (“2017 Poverty Guidelines,” 2017). Economists of happiness have reported
that levels of optimism, happiness, and life satisfaction vary by income, with
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people  from  lower  SES  backgrounds  consistently  scoring  lower  on  these
measures  than  those from middle-  and  upper-  middle  class  backgrounds
(e.g. Graham; 2017; Kahneman & Deaton, 2010).  This could indicate that
lower-SES children may be less prone to a wishful thinking bias (as it is a
type of  optimism).  However,  Marks (1951) found that SES did not impact
wishful thinking in grade school children, suggesting that the lower-SES U.S.
children might score similarly to the samples previously tested. 
Experiment 3 Methods
Participants 
Experiment 3 included 45 children. Twenty children participated in the
experimental condition (M age= 4.47, DS= .59; range= 3.5 to 5.46), and 25
in the control condition (M age= 4.46, SD= .6; range= 3.43 to 5.59). Children
were recruited and tested at Head Start programs in Berkeley, CA. 
Methods
Methods were identical to the experimental and unmotivated control
conditions of Experiment 2; all children viewed a clear bag of blue and yellow
eggs. Children were tested in a quiet room or hallway at their preschool. 
Results
Children were scored according to whether they guessed the majority
egg  color.  A  binary  logistic  regression  measured  if  age (as  a  continuous
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variable)  and  condition  predicted  majority  response.  The  model  was
statistically  significant  χ2(2)  =  12.416,  p=.002,  Nagelkerke  R2 =  .326.
Analyses revealed a main effect of condition, χ2 = 8.339,  df = 1,  p =.004.
There was no effect of age, p=.135, ns. 
Two-tailed  binomial  tests  compared  responses  to  chance.  In  the
experimental condition, only 3 of 20 (or 15%; SD= .37; 95% CI= -.02- .32)
children  guessed  the  majority  egg,  which  is  significantly  below  chance,
p=.003; in the control condition 15 of 25 (or 60%; SD= .5; 95% CI= .39- .81)
children guessed the majority egg, which is not significantly different from
chance, p=.424, ns. 
In the experimental condition, all but 1 child (95%) stated they wanted
the desirable egg. In the control condition, 68% of children correctly stated
the majority  egg color,  while  60% of  children did so in  the experimental
condition. Looking only at these children, 9 of 17 (53%) children stated the
majority color in the control condition, and only 1 of 11 (9%) did so in the
experimental  condition.  The  difference  across  conditions  remained
significant, p=.041 (two-tailed Fisher’s exact test). 
Experiment 3 Discussion 
Experiment  3  extends  findings  from Experiments  1  and  2  to  lower
income children in the U.S.A. Three-to 5-year-old children enrolled in Head
Start programs displayed very high levels of wishful thinking, where 85% of
children  provided  an  optimistically  biased  response  in  the  experimental
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condition. These responses are similar to the middle-income U.S. American,
and Peruvian 3- to 5- year-olds. 
Experiment 4
Age did not influence 4-to- 6-year-olds’ responses in the experimental
conditions  of  Experiments  1,  2  and  3.  Children  displayed  high  levels  of
wishful  thinking across  experiments;  for  example,  77% of  children stated
that the highly improbable, yet desirable egg was selected in Experiment 2.
Intuitively, it seems that adults would not show such a strong bias, and that
with age, this bias should attenuate, at least to some extent. We explore this
more in Experiments 4 and 5 by extending this paradigm to older children.
Experiment 4 Methods
Participants
Eighty U.S. and 80 Peruvian 5- to 7-year-olds participated in this study.
Participant demographic information and testing setup were similar to that of
Experiments 1 and 2.  See Table 1 for  more information on subject  ages.
Additionally, one 6-year-old was tested and not included in the final sample
due to experimenter error. 
Methods
Procedures were identical to the experimental and unmotivated control
conditions of Experiments 2 and 3 with two exceptions. First, children were
34
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
RUNNING HEAD: Young children are wishful thinkers
not told there were stickers inside of the eggs or shown the prizes. Rather,
they were told that the eggs contained “prizes.” This was to control for any
developmental  differences  in  the  desirability  of  specific  types  of  prizes.
Second, light blue and yellow eggs were used for children from both Peru
and the U.S.
Results
A  binary  logistic  regression  explored  if  children’s  responses  were
predicted  by  age  (continuous)  country  (Peru  vs.  U.S.A.)  and  condition
(experimental  vs.  control). The  model  was  significant,  χ2(3)  =  38.456,  p
<.0001, Nagelkerke R2 = .286. Analyses revealed a main effect of condition,
χ2 = 29.984,  df = 1,  p <.0001, indicating that children were more likely to
guess  the  majority  egg  color  in  the  control  condition  than  in  the
experimental condition. There was a trending effect of age, χ2 = 2.98, df = 1,
p= .084 indicating that older children were slightly more likely to choose the
majority  egg  color  than  younger  children;  country  was  an  insignificant
predictor, p =.258, ns.
< Insert Figure 2>
Next,  we  split  participants  into  condition,  and  two  binary  logistic
regressions were used to explore if age (as a continuous variable) predicted
children’s responses in the experimental and control conditions individually.
Age did not predict children’s responses in the control condition, the model
was not significant,  χ2(1) = 1.321,  p =.25, Nagelkerke R2 = .025, and age
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was not a significant predictor,  χ2 = 1.322,  df = 1,  p =.25,  ns.  Age was,
however,  a significant predictor  in the experimental  condition.  The model
was significant, χ2(1) = 10.227, p =.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .166, and age was
a significant  predictor  variable  χ2 = 9.202,  df = 1,  p =.002.  This  finding
indicates that with age, children were less likely to display wishful thinking. 
Two-tailed  Binomial  tests  were  again  used  to  compare  children’s
responses to chance. Overall, in the control condition, 63 of 80 (or 79%; SD=
.41,  95% CI=  .7-  .88)  children  predicted  the  majority  response,  which  is
significantly  above  chance  p<.0001.  This  can  be  contrasted  with  the
experimental condition, where 27 of 80 (or 34%; SD= .48, 95% CI= .23- .44)
children stated the majority response, which is significantly below chance,
p=.005. 
< Insert Table 1> 
At the end of the experiment, 94% of children in the control condition
and 81% of  children  in  the  experimental  condition  correctly  recalled  the
majority color. In the experimental condition, all but 7 children (91%) stated
they  wanted  the  egg  with  the  prizes.  After  removing  the  children  who
answered  these  questions  incorrectly,  58  of  75  (or  77%)  children  in  the
control  condition  and  16  of  61  (or  26%)  children  in  the  experimental
condition guessed the majority egg. A Fisher’s exact test confirmed that the
difference between conditions remained significant, p<.0001. 
Experiment 4 Discussion
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Experiment 4 again found a strong effect of wishful thinking. Children
were much more likely to state the majority egg color in the control condition
than  in  the  experimental  condition.  We  also  saw  that  age  influenced
children’s responses in the experimental condition; older children were less
likely than younger children to display a wishful thinking bias. No difference
was  observed  in  the  control  condition.  In  sum,  Experiment  3  replicates
findings  from  Experiments  1  and  2,  and  provides  initial  support  for  the
hypothesis  that  wishful  thinking  declines  with  age.  In  Experiment  5,  we
follow up on this finding by testing 7-to 10-year-old children in the U.S. 
Experiment 5 Methods
Participants
Participants included 32 7-to 10-year-old children (mean age= 8.69,
SD=1.04,  range=  7.02  to  10.55)  from  the  San  Francisco  Bay  Area.
Additionally, 1 child was tested and dropped because the experimenter did
not  obtain  a  birthdate.  Participant  demographic  information  is  similar  to
Experiments 1 to 4. Due to limitations in access to Peruvian children, data
analysis for Experiment 5 is restricted to the U.S. However, experimenters
were able to collect a partial sample of Peru 7- and 8-year-olds (n=16), and
these children are included in  Table 1 as well  as the meta-analysis  after
Experiment 5. Demographic information for these children is similar to that
in the previous experiments. 
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Methods
Methods were identical to the experimental condition of Experiment 4.
Given  that  the  previous  samples  demonstrated  proficient  probabilistic
reasoning  skills,  and  age  is  the  primary  variable  of  interest,  a  control
condition was not included. 
Results
A binary  logistic  regression  was  used to  explore  if  age (continuous
variable)  predicted  children’s  responses  in  the  experimental  condition.
Results indicated a significant effect of age. The model was significant, χ2(1)
= 12.153, p <.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .454, and age was a significant predictor
variable, χ2 = 6.747, df = 1, p =.009. 
 Twenty-three of 32 (or 72%; SD= .46, 95% CI of the mean= .55 to .88)
children stated the majority  egg color,  which  is  significantly  greater  than
chance would predict,  p=.02 (two-tailed binomial test), indicating that most
7-to 10-year-old children did not demonstrate wishful thinking. 
At the end of the experiment, 3 children did not correctly state the
majority egg color, and 1 child did not state that they wanted the egg color
with the prizes. Removing these children from the sample indicates that 21
of 28 (or 75%) of children still  chose the majority egg color,  which is still
significantly above chance,  p=.013 (two-tailed binomial test). A regression
analysis  on  these  children  revealed  age  trends  comparable  to  those
described above. 
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Experiment 5 Discussion
Experiment 5 extends on findings from Experiment 4 and suggests that
children’s  tendency  to  engage  in  wishful  thinking  continues  to  decline
between 7 and 10 years of age. In this study, most children did not display a
bias, however previous studies have found evidence for wishful thinking in
grade school children and even adults. Notably, however, the adult research
suggests that the bias is only reliably observed when the ratio of the two
outcomes  is  near  50:50.  In  the  present  study,  the  ratio  was  much more
extreme, 80:20. Given this, it would be interesting to measure 7-to 10- year-
olds’ predictions with less extreme ratios.  
Additionally, previous studies used slightly different methods than the
present study.  For example, in the present study, we visually display the
ratios directly to children, whereas Marks (1951) verbally stated the ratios to
children. The present study also asked children to make judgments about an
event  that  had  already  occurred  (the  egg  was  already  selected  when
children  were  asked  to  make  the  judgment),  whereas  Marks  (1951)  and
others asked participants to make a prediction about a card that would be
selected in the near future. These types of methodological differences could
have influenced participant’s tendency to display a wishful thinking bias.  
Meta-Analysis
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To  further  explore  the  observed  age  trend  on  wishful  thinking,  we
conducted a meta-analysis on the experimental conditions from Experiments
2, 4, and 5. This resulted in a total of 194 children. To get a more complete
picture of developmental trends within each country, we also included 16
Peruvian 7- and 8-year-olds (mean age= 7.8; SD= .31; range= 7.05- 8.27)
who were tested for Experiment 5, however, due to limitations, a complete
sample was not collected. This resulted in a total sample size of 210 children
(mean age= 6.29; SD= 1.6; range= 3.53- 10.55). 
First,  a  binary  logistic  regression  explored  the  effect  of  age  on  all
children’s responses. The model was significant,  χ2(1) = 37.973,  p <.0001,
Nagelkerke  R2 =  .23,  and  age  was  a  significant  predictor  variable,  χ2 =
30.046, df = 1, p <.0001.  
Next,  we  split  the  data  set  by  country.  This  resulted  in  113  U.S.
children (mean age= 6.51; SD= 1.77, range= 3.53- 10.55) and 97 Peruvian
children  (mean  age=  6.02;  SD=  1.33;  3.64-  8.27).  Two  binary  logistic
regressions explored the effect of age on responses. The model for the U.S.
children  was  highly  significant,  χ2(1)  =  42.084,  p <.0001,  Nagelkerke  R2
= .418, and age was a significant predictor variable, χ2 = 25.976, df = 1, p
<.0001.  In  Peru,  the  model  did  not  approach  significance,  χ2(1)  =  1.12,
p=.29,  Nagelkerke  R2 =  .017,  and  age  was  not  a  significant  predictor
variable, χ2 = 1.102, df = 1, p =.294. Additionally, we split participants into
quartiles  based  on  age,  then  further  divided  them  by  country.  Table  2
presents an overview of ages and responses. 
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<Insert Table 2>
General Discussion
Across all experiments, 3- to 5-year-old children reliably displayed a
very  strong  wishful  thinking  bias.  This  finding  held  across  cultures  and
socioeconomic  backgrounds.  In  the U.S.,  this  bias gradually  declined with
age, with preschool children displaying the strongest bias and 7-to 10-year-
olds displaying no bias. The meta-analysis suggests that this trend may be
different  in  Peru,  possibly  weaker,  or  later  developing,  however  further
research should be conducted with older Peruvian children given that the
age ranges were slightly different across populations.  
Across experiments, children made accurate probabilistic judgments in
control  conditions,  with  the  exception  of  the  lower  income  children  in
Experiment 3. In Experiments 1 and 2, older children made more accurate
judgments  in  the  control  conditions  than  younger  children.  Even  so,  the
youngest children still  reliably provided accurate responses. These results
confirm  the  earlier  findings  on  probabilistic  reasoning,  suggesting  that
children’s success may be largely dependent on the task demands of the
experimental design. With appropriately simplified materials, children under
7 can give explicit and accurate probabilistic judgments. 
We found that age influenced children’s judgments in the experimental
condition;  older  children  were  less  likely  to  display  wishful  thinking  than
younger children. Previously, researchers have measured wishful thinking in
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school  age  children  and  adults,  and  those  results  suggest  that  wishful
thinking may continue to decline during development.  This raises questions
about what specifically changes with age, and why older children and adults
are less likely to engage in wishful thinking than young children.
One possibility  is  that  there is  simply a strong early,  perhaps even
inbuilt, tendency for desires to causally influence predictions and that this
tendency  becomes  weaker  with  age.  However,  these  results  could  also
suggest  that  young  children’s  beliefs  about  uncertain  outcomes  undergo
conceptual revision over development, and these beliefs, rather than a direct
influence of desires on predictions, are responsible for changes in wishful
thinking. Young children may initially use their desires to predict uncertain
outcomes,  or  even  believe  that  their  desires  have  a  causal  impact  on
outcomes. Indeed, in some cases this may be a reasonable assumption, for
example, in cases where people can actually exert control over outcomes. In
addition,  adults  often modify  outcomes to be consistent  with  infants  and
young children’s desires; they help children get what they want, providing
further  support  for  this  belief.  As  children get older,  they may encounter
more situations where they don’t  get what they want and where the link
between desires and outcomes is more tenuous. Over the course of time,
children may begin to realize that desires don't always lead to outcomes,
and  instead  rely  on  other  information  to  make  predictions,  such  as  the
likelihood evidence in the present studies. 
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Alternatively,  people may  continue  to  have  a  strong  disposition
towards wishful thinking throughout development, either intrinsically, or as a
result of beliefs,  but their other beliefs about randomness and probability
could  undergo  conceptual  change  with  development  and  offset  this
tendency. As their understanding of probability improves, children may begin
to override the tendency to engage in wishful thinking. Of course, changes
could also occur along several dimensions simultaneously. 
These  competing  hypotheses  can  all  explain  why  adults  and  older
children still show some evidence of a wishful thinking bias. Adults and older
children  could  simply  hold  a  weaker  desire  bias,  or  a  weaker  belief  that
desires cause outcomes, resulting in less biased inferences in both cases. If
so, adults and older children should be less likely than younger children to
display wishful thinking across a variety of situations. Alternatively, adults
and  older  children  may  develop  a  stronger  belief  in  the  alternative
hypothesis  that  probability  influences the outcome.  If  so,  wishful  thinking
might reemerge when evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis is weak
or nonexistent (e.g.  ratios are less extreme, or no probability evidence is
provided), when the causal pathway towards an outcome is more convoluted
and  mysterious,  or  when  participants  are  asked  to  make  judgments  in
domains where they have limited prior knowledge. 
In  addition  to  explaining  why  wishful  thinking  changes  during
development, these accounts can be used to make predictions about how
wishful  thinking  relates  to  childhood  optimism more  generally.  If  wishful
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thinking is generally responsible for optimism and children’s wishful thinking
declines,  then  we  should  see  optimism decline  at  a  similar  pace  across
domains.  Moreover,  it  should  be  possible  to  explore  whether  there  are
correlations  between  changes  in  wishful  thinking  and  in  other  kinds  of
optimism.  However,  if  children display less  wishful  thinking  because they
develop a stronger  belief  in  a competing hypothesis,  then developmental
changes in optimism that result from wishful thinking should differ across
domains, and should depend on the availability of evidence in favor of the
alternative hypothesis.
There are some limitations to the current studies. Earlier studies and
the performance in the control conditions suggest that children do indeed
infer  a random sampling process.  Moreover,  the experimenters  in  all  the
studies emphasized the random nature of the events – shuffling the cards
and mixing up the eggs in an opaque bag, events that even infants interpret
as random processes (e.g. Denison and Xu, 2014),  closing their  eyes and
looking away while selecting an egg, and explicitly stating that they did not
know the outcome. However, it is possible that children may have thought
that the experimenter intentionally “fixed” the process in a deceptive way to
give  them  the  prizes,  analogous  perhaps  to  adults  intentionally  letting
children win card games. Given this possibility,  one next step could be to
explore if  the findings replicate in a condition where the random process
does not involve an agent. 
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Another  possibility  is  that  children  could  have  stated  the  desirable
response partly because there was no cost associated with being incorrect.
The motivated control condition in Experiment 2 did suggest that motivating
younger children to be correct increased their accuracy, but no conditions
explored whether associating a cost  or  benefit  with  accuracy would  alter
children’s predictions in the experimental conditions. 
Another  possibility  is  that  reasoning about  probability  together  with
desirability  requires advances in  some other aspect of  cognition,  such as
inhibitory control. Perhaps stating the probable outcome in the experimental
condition  requires  children  to  first  inhibit  themselves  from  stating  the
desirable outcome. If so, older children and adults may display a stronger
bias under certain conditions,  for example when they are asked to make
rapid judgments. 
In any case, these studies support the hypothesis that young children,
from all the backgrounds we tested, have a strong wishful thinking bias, and
that wishful thinking declines with age.  However, it is not yet clear exactly
why  young  children  engage  in  wishful  thinking  and  what  causes
developmental change. Furthermore, it is not yet entirely clear how wishful
thinking  is  related  to  previous  developmental  findings  on  optimism,
positivity,  confidence  and  theory  of  mind.  Future  research  should  more
thoroughly explore these questions. 
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Figure 1. Proportion of children who stated the majority response in 
Experiment 1. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.
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Figure  2.  Proportion  of  children  who  stated  the  majority  response  in
Experiment 4. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean. 
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Table 1. 
Summary  of  participants  ages  and  responses.  Table  includes  subject
numbers, mean ages (one standard deviation of the mean age), age ranges,
the percent (and number) of participants who guessed the majority card or
egg,  95%  confidence  intervals  for  the  mean  number  participants  who
guessed the  majority  card  or  egg,  and p-values from two-tailed  binomial
tests comparing the pattern of responses to chance.
Group n Mean 
Age 
(SD)
Age 
Range
% (#) 
Guess
ed 
Majori
ty
95% CI
for the
Mean
Binomi
al 
Tests
Experiment 1
U.S.  Experimental
4s
41 4.47 (.3) 3.86–5 44%
(18)
.28-. 6 p=.533
U.S.  Experimental
6s
41 6.44
(.31)
5.94–7 54%
(22)
.38- .7 p=.755
U.S. Control 4s 41 4.47
(.32)
3.9–5.09 68%
(28)
.53- .83 p=.028
U.S. Control 6s 41 6.47
(.33)
5.95–7 88%
(36)
.77- .98 p<.000
1
Peru  Experimental
4s
23 4.54
(.27)
3.97–4.85 35% (8) .14- .56 p=.21
Peru  Experimental
6s
25 6.55
(.25)
6.06–7.0 52%
(13)
.31- .73 p=1
Peru Control 4s 23 4.3 (.32) 3.87–4.98 61%
(14)
.39- .82 p=.405
Peru Control 6s 25 6.55
(.33)
5.94–6.98 84%
(21)
.69- .99 p<.001
Experiment 2
U.S. Experimental 41 5.08
(1.1)
3.53-6.96 20% (8) .07- .32 p<.001
U.S. Unmotivated 40 4.98
(1.05)
3.51-6.99 78%
(31)
.64- .91 p<.001
U.S. Motivated 40 5.05
(1.04)
3.55-6.95 68%
(27)
.52- .83 p=.039
Peru Experimental 41 5.13
(1.11)
3.64-7 27%
(11)
.13- .41 p=.004
Peru Unmotivated 41 5.41
(1.13)
3.7-7.1 63%
(26)
.48- .79 p=.117
Peru Motivated 46 4.82 3.65-6.83 70% .56- .83 p=.011
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(.92) (32)
Experiment 3 
Low-SES
Experimental
20 4.47
(.59)
3.5- 5.46 15% (3) -.02- .32 p=.003
Low- SES Control 25 4.46
(.59)
3.43- 
5.59
60%
(15)
.39- .81 p=.424
Experiment 4
U.S. Experimental 40 6.23
(.89)
4.94-
7.86
43%
(17)
.26- .59 p=.43
U.S. Control 40 6.23
(.88)
4.98-
7.84
78%
(31) 
.64- .91 p<.001
Peru Experimental 40 6.22
(.94)
5.01-
7.94
25%
(10)
.11- .39 p=.002
Peru Control 40 6.36
(.88)
5.00-
7.95
80%
(32)
.67- .93 p<.001
Experiment 5
U.S. Experimental 32 8.69
(1.04)
7.02-
10.55
72%
(23)
.55- .88 p=.02
Additional Data
Peru Experimental 16 7.8 (.31) 7.05-
8.27
31% (5) .06- .57 p=.21
Table 2. 
Summary  of  participants  included  in  the  meta-analysis  on  experimental
conditions  and responses given.  Table 2 includes subject  numbers,  mean
ages (one standard deviation of the mean age), age ranges, the percent (and
number) of participants who stated the majority egg color, 95% confidence
intervals for the mean number of participants who stated the majority egg
color,  and  p-values  from  two-tailed  binomial  tests  comparing  majority
responses to chance. Data is split into quartiles based on participants’ ages,
then  further  subdivided  by  country;  quartiles  are  age  matched  across
countries, with the exception of the eldest quartile. 
Group n Mean 
Age 
(SD)
Age 
Range
% (#) 
Guesse
d 
Majorit
y
95% CI 
for the 
Mean
Binomi
al 
Tests
Peru and U.S.
All participants 210 6.29 3.53- 35% .29- .42 p<.000
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(1.6) 10.55 (74) 1
Youngest 53 4.35
(.54)
3.53-
5.11
17% (9) .07- .27 p<.000
1
2nd youngest 53 5.64
(.31)
5.13-
6.16
21%
(11)
.09- .32 p<.000
1
2nd oldest 52 6.78
(.38)
6.18-
7.47
37%
(19)
.23- .5 p=.07
Oldest 52 8.42
(.86)
7.49-
10.55
67%
(35)
.54- .8 p=.018
U.S. 
All participants 113 6.51
(1.77)
3.53-
10.55
43%
(48)
.33- .52 p=.132
Youngest 28 4.37
(.58)
3.53-
5.11
11% (3) -.02- .23 p<.000
1
2nd youngest 27 5.74
(.26)
5.29-
6.16
19% (5) .29- .34 p=.002
2nd oldest 26 6.83
(.37)
6.18-
7.47
50%
(13)
.29- .71 p=1.15
5
Oldest 32 8.78
(.92)
7.56-
10.55
84%
(27)
.71- .98 p=.000
1
Peru
All participants 97 6.02
(1.33)
3.64-
8.27
27%
(26)
.18- .36 p<.000
1
Youngest 25 4.33
(.51)
3.64-
5.07
24% (6) .06- .42 p=.015
2nd youngest 26 5.53
(.32)
5.13-
6.12
23% (6) .06- .4 p=.009
2nd oldest 26 6.73
(.38)
6.22-
7.43
23% (6) .06- .4 p=.009
Oldest 20 7.85
(.21)
7.49-
8.27
40% (8) .16- .64 p=.503
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